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I. INTRODUCTION
Longstanding discontent persists about the role of inter
national economic institutions in the global economy. Some
perceive globalization as producing substantial injustice.1 Those

* Professor of Law, University of La Verne College of Law, Ontario California,
john_linarelli@ulv.edu. I want to express my thanks to Dean Donald Dunn for funding to
support this research, made possible through the summer research stipend program at the
University of La Verne College of Law. I am grateful to Carl Cranor for valuable comments.
This article benefited from presentation at the American Society of International Law
International Economic Law conference, held February 2426, 2005 at the American
University Washington College of Law in Washington DC. Conference Theme: “Does Free
Trade Guarantee Peace, Liberty and Security?” I am particularly grateful for comments
provided at the conference by Frank Garcia. This article also benefited from presentation as
part of the University of La Verne College of Law Scholarship Workshop Series. I am
grateful for comments made at my talk to the faculty by Charles Doskow, Donald Dunn,
Donna Greschner, Kevin Marshall, Irving Prager and H. Randall Rubin. All errors are
mine.
1. For example, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu says that globalization:
is a myth in the strong sense of the word, a powerful discourse, an idée
force, an idea which has social force, which obtains belief . . . It ratifies
and glorifies the reign of what are called the financial markets, in other
words, the return to a kind of radical capitalism, with no other law than
that of maximum profit, an unfettered capitalism without any disguise,
but rationalized, pushed to the limit of its economic efficacy by the
introduction of modern forms of domination, such as ‘business
administration,’ and techniques of manipulation, such as market
research and advertising . . . .
In short, globalization is not homogenization; on the contrary, it is
the extension of the hold of a small number of dominant nations over the
whole set of national financial markets.
PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 34–35, 38
(Richard Nice trans., New Press 1999).

181

182

J. OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:2

who favor globalization blithely dismiss the objections of
globalization critics. Writing on the protests that occurred at the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle Ministerial Conference,
Thomas Friedman wrote in the New York Times, “Is there
anything more ridiculous in the news today than the protests
against the World Trade Organization in Seattle?”2 Friedman
called the protestors “a Noah’s ark of flatearth advocates,
protectionist trade unions and yuppies looking for their 1960’s [sic]
fix.”3 It seems like a cognitive or linguistic inability to understand
each other exists. Neither side knows what the other is talking
about.
Much of the criticism of the WTO and the other multinational
economic institutions focuses on the power of multinational
enterprises. What power do multinationals actually exert on the
policies and operations of these institutions? The influence of the
multinational enterprises has been difficult to articulate and
explain in terms familiar to lawyers and policy makers. We have
trouble breaking out of the barriers we are educated to respect.
Public choice theory informs us that we should be concerned about
the influence of powerful lobbying groups who work within the
political processes of the governments of WTO members. These
interest groups, the story goes, capture the negotiating positions of
powerful WTO members and influence the agenda, as it is set in
the WTO negotiating rounds and in the work done between the
rounds. They exercise a similar sway over the policies and
operations of other international economic institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and the development banks.
For example, if we want to understand the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), we
might want to inquire about the role of the pharmaceutical, film,
and recording industries, in assisting the United States
Government in formulating negotiating positions for TRIPS. Some
would argue that these interest groups persuade the governments
of highincome countries that TRIPS should contain a strong set of
intellectual property protections that go far beyond the traditional
remit of what the GATT/WTO framework ever aspired to
previously. 4

2. Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Foreign Affairs; Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1999, at A23.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
AntiCircumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 521–24
(1999) (arguing that Hollywood persuaded Congress to adopt legislation that exceeded
treaty requirements under the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty).
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Because of such influence, the argument goes, the
multinationals are able to get what they want, resulting in unfair
agreements. The WTO agreements, the argument continues,
comply with few or no standards of fairness, or if they do, it is
accidental. They may lower tariffs and barriers to trade in
services so that companies can effectively operate across borders,
but they may also maintain barriers to trade to protect powerful
interests who benefit from protectionism.
These are the
arguments. I summarize them; I do not necessarily accept them,
at least in their simple form.
Does the divisiveness derive from lack of consensus on a
theory of justice with which we can deliberate about the merits of
international economic agreements? No legal system deserving of
continued support can exist without an adequate theory of justice.
This article is about the elaboration of a theory of justice to
underpin international economic law and international economic
institutions. A world trade constitution cannot credibly exist
without a clear notion of justice upon which to base a consensus.
Despite attempts to describe a world trade “legal system” or
constitution, no such system or constitution yet exists in a way
credible to many people. There is yet no consensus on the public
reason underpinning the rules and the institutions. Much of the
antiglobalization dissent, though sometimes unfocused and
confused, seems bottomed on the basic notion that a legal system
requires a theory of justice. Governments will never get their
populaces to embrace international economic law and institutions
without a consensus on what is just in the international economic
sphere. Scholars and practitioners have expended great effort in
improving our understanding of world trade rules and policies, but
the normative dimensions of such inquiry seems incomplete
without an underlying consensus of sufficiently wide scope on the
reasons for the rules and policies. That the rules and policies now
encroach upon areas of domestic regulation in sensitive policy
areas serves to highlight the problem.
Economic efficiency has been the benchmark often used to
evaluate the merits of international economic agreements.
Economic efficiency is a commonly understood aspiration
embedded in the idea of progressive liberalization: the
progressiveness of liberalization is determined based on efficiency
gains. I have no qualms about economic efficiency. I think it is a
valuable tool, and I think economists bring a very useful toolkit to
the table. I am not going to expend any effort in bashing
economics because such bashing is wrongheaded. I refocus away
from economics, however, away from the efficiencyversus
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distribution dimensions of conceptualizing the effects of
international economic institutions.
I devote this article to
examining approaches to understanding the allocation of resources
that most economists are unwilling to devote much energy
analyzing. I have nothing against economics, but I do not see how
we can base a constitutional system solely on efficiency. In fact, no
existing constitutional system is. Why should efficiency be the
default principle?
One of the questions I explore is Kantian in influence: is there
a universal and cosmopolitan constructivist procedure we can
apply to better understand international economic agreements, to
improve our deliberation about the WTO and to develop a
consensus on what is and is not acceptable? This article is located
firmly in moral philosophy and hangs closely to deontological
approaches to moral philosophy.
No critical or postmodern
approaches are undertaken.
This article examines alternatives to the question of what
should be a proper distributional framework for the design of
international economic treaties and institutions. In this article, I
discuss two approaches, those of John Rawls and T.M. Scanlon,
focusing primarily on Scanlon’s work. The natural starting point
for any discussion of moral theory in the context of social
institutions is Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.5 I will not expend as
much effort on Rawls as I should, though he offers the most
influential account.6 I cannot avoid Rawls. Rawls wrote the most
influential piece of moral philosophy in the twentieth century. His
A Theory of Justice must form a base to discuss a cousin theory
that has gained a good deal of recent popularity, the contractualist
account of T.M. Scanlon, the most recent elaboration of which is in
Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other.7 Both accounts protect
each person; this feature is what distinguishes them from
utilitarianism.
We could focus on other theories. I would have to write a book
rather than an article if I were to survey exhaustively theories in
competition with Rawls’s theory of justice, but it is worth at least
brief mention of a few. Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum

5. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
6. Frank Garcia has done a series of important articles on Rawls and world trade. See,
e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 291 (2004); Frank J. Garcia, Building a Just Trade Order for A New Millennium, 33
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1015 (2001); Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic
Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 975 (2000).
7. T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998).
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propose what is known as a capabilities approach.8 To Sen and
Nussbaum, some goods are inputs needed to function in society.
They propose that governments equalize the ability to function in a
society. The capabilities approach has had some influence on the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which in 1993
began to assess quality of life using the concept of people’s
capabilities.9
Ronald Dworkin argues that there should be
equality of basic resources available to persons, with a mechanism
for valuing nontransferable resources (such as native talent) in
terms of transferable resources.10 Gerard Cohen argues for
equalizing access to advantage.11 I could go on with this list, but I
will mention just one more because her theory will get lots of play
in the coming years. Susan Hurley articulates a cognitivist theory
of distributive justice, which aims to neutralize bias in order to
develop greater public agreement on what is good.12 Hurley’s idea
of cognitive theory focuses on the metaethics of justice concepts.
She wants to solve the problem of the divide between private and
public reason that Rawls deals with in Political Liberalism.13
I do not discuss rules in a comprehensive way, though I do
apply the tools set forth in this article to one persistent problem —
the regulation of intellectual property rights at the WTO level and
access to pharmaceuticals in lowincome countries. Rules are very
important. Nevertheless, I do not think this project is at the stage
yet where I can offer systematic applications of the decision
procedures set forth in this article. At most, one could say that
this article is about what lawyers call policies about rules. Its
focus is how to evaluate whether a rule is desirable or not based on
an underlying value. This article is representative of a project, one
to articulate philosophical thought about justice for application in
the future, perhaps to compare with efficiency results. Looking at
theories of justice seems required if governments are to come up
with meaningful crosscultural comparisons of quality of life.
What are the norms for evaluating the socalled constitutional
order? We cannot claim to have a constitutional order without

8. Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS 117, 122, 132 (Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin, eds. 2002);
Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 197, 217
(Sterling M. McMurrin ed. 1980); A MARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, 39–55 (1992);
AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 199–218 (1973).
9. Nussbaum, supra note 8, at 119.
10. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
11. G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 916 (1989).
12. S. L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK AND KNOWLEDGE 246–253 (2003).
13. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213–22 (1993).
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understanding what that order is based upon. It is difficult to
have a conversation about global injustice without common
standards.
So many ways of approaching this project exist that
undoubtedly I am open to criticism for failing to address
something. I have been very selective in this article. Some may
see as a glaring omission that I am not expending much effort
discussing human rights. Others have said much more about
human rights that I can say. For discussions from the perspective
of philosophy see works by Thomas Pogge14 and Jürgen
Habermas,15 and for discussions from the perspective of a
philosophically informed legal scholar see works by ErnstUlrich
Petersmann.16 If this is a weakness in my approach, it is one
shared with others. For example, Onora O’Neill, a prominent
Kantian, explains that “[t]he most significant structures of ethical
concern can be expressed in linked webs of requirements, which are
better articulated by beginning from the perspective of agents and
their obligations rather than that of claimants and their rights.”17
The idea here is that “there can be requirements on us that no one
has any standing to require of us.”18 Whether we want to “legalize”
these requirements to produce legally binding obligations, so that
someone has such standing in the courts, is a question for policy
makers informed by the standards found in this and other works.
II. RULE ORIENTATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FAIRNESS
One of the most significant achievements of the Uruguay
Round was the negotiation of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU).19 The DSU creates the rules and the
institutions for binding settlement of disputes relating to WTO
14. See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, in GLOBAL
JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 8, at 151.
15. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, On Legitimation Through Human Rights, in GLOBAL
JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 8, at 197.
16. See, e.g., ErnstUlrich Petersmann, From ‘Negative’ to ‘Positive’ Integration in the
WTO: Time for ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ into WTO Law?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1363 (2000); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law in
the 21st Century: The Need to Clarify Their Relationships, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2001);
ErnstUlrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 19
(2000).
17. ONORA O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF
PRACTICAL REASONING 4 (1996).
18. Stephen Darwall, Respect and the SecondPerson Standpoint, 78 PROC. &
ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N 43, 44 (2004).
19. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
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agreements between or among WTO members.20 The DSU, by its
own terms, explains that “[t]he dispute settlement system of the
WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability
to the multilateral trading system.”21 The DSU is an important
stage in the evolution of the world trading system towards
legalism, in which “legalist” approaches to dispute settlement in
the world trading system evolve from “pragmatist” approaches,
based primarily in diplomacy.22 Some contend that there is a move
towards legalization in the international sphere generally and that
the WTO is one good example of this trend.23
John Jackson’s ruleversuspower orientation is one of the
most important and wellknown insights in the literature on world
trade law.24 In making this distinction Jackson, a careful scholar,
made few claims about the justice of the rules. He did not say that
the WTO agreements and institutions constitute a legal system.
But he opened the way for thinking about whether the WTO is
actually a legal system. Some scholars claim that the WTO system
is constitutional, that a “world trade constitution” exists.25 Others,
relying on positivist notions of the law found in Hart and even in
Austin, make claims about the existence of a world trade legal
system.26
Two kinds of theories about the international legal order are
influential in the present day: positivist and instrumental.27 Both
these theories maintain longstanding relationships going back to
Bentham, who was both a positivist and a utilitarian. Both
approaches fail to provide adequate accounts of justice. Positivism

20. Id.
21. Id. Art. 3(2).
22. See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 833–34 (1995).
23. See, e.g., id.; LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 1–2 (Judith Goldstein et al. eds.,
2001).
24. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109–11 (2d ed. 1998).
25. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511, 514–15, 542–43, 604 (2000).
26. David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System, 24 FORDHAM INT’ L L.J. 444, 478–80
(2000). Contra Raj Bhala & Lucienne Attard, Austin’s Ghost and DSU Reform, 37 INT’L
LAWYER 651, 676 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he fundamental requisites for ‘law’ and ‘legal’
system in Austin’s paradigm are not all satisfied by the WTO and its DSU”).
27. I do not claim that positivists hold the view that international law is law. See
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–37 (2d ed. 1994), in which Hart offers his famous
argument that international law is an important set of social, as opposed to legal, rules. In
Hartian positivism, the basic problem with international law is the lack of secondary rules
of recognition. Many have taken on these arguments and have tried to show that
international law, at least in its contemporary level of development, is law. See, e.g., ALLEN
BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELFDETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46–53 (2004). No need exists to go into this topic here, since the point
of the above analysis is simply that lawyers conceptualize WTO law in positivistic terms.
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is obsessed with the pedigree of rules. In its exclusive form, it
requires the separation of law and morality. In its inclusive form,
it denies any necessary connection between law and morality but
admits that a connection between law and morality is possible.
Clearly, positivism does not require any moral criteria to assess
the pedigree of legal rules. Instrumentalists, most notably law and
economics scholars, argue that concepts of justice are rhetorical.
Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith, for example, argue that states
use “moralistic and legalistic rhetoric” to advance their own
interests.28 Why this rhetoric (if it is rhetoric) is less helpful in
furthering our understanding than the metaphors of game theory,
such as “cheap talk” and “signaling,”29 is for another article, but
what the law and economics approach fails to identify is their
longstanding connection to a discredited Benthamism. Law and
economics scholars make the same arguments about justice that
Bentham did in the eighteenth century. In The Principles of
Morals and Legislation, Bentham explains in a footnote that:
justice, in the only sense in which it has a meaning,
is an imaginary personage, feigned for the
convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the
dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases.
Justice, then, is nothing more than an imaginary
instrument, employed to forward on certain
occasions, and by certain means, the purposes of
benevolence.30
In The Theory of Legislation, Bentham uses the words “just” and
“unjust” along with other words “simply as collective terms
including the ideas of certain pains or pleasures.”31
One of the major defects that positivism and instrumentalism
share is that if we assume that they provide adequate accounts for
legal principles, either in pedigree or in rational choice, then they
produce bad counterexamples. It is easy to come up with a system

28. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International
Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 133 (2002) [hereinafter
Goldsmith & Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric]. See also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH & POSNER,
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW].
29. Goldsmith & Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric, supra note 28 at 115.
30. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 120 n.b2 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970).
31. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 2 (Oceana Publications 1975).
These references are discussed in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, a 1958 article appearing
in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, and now reprinted in JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 48–
49 (Samuel Freeman ed. 1999).
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of positivistic and efficient rules that are unjust. Justice simply is
not a criterion in these accounts, unless it arises as a matter of
practice within the activity of law itself, an accidental
circumstance and not a necessary condition of the account.
These two prevailing accounts of international economic law,
positivism and instrumentalism, when combined with concepts
from both the normative welfare economics of international trade
and also the political economy of international trade, produce a
quasiutilitarian framework for the assessment of international
economic law and institutions.32 Quasiutilitarianism is, it seems,
the default principle. I use the term quasiutilitarianism because
economics is distinct from utilitarianism, particularly from the
Millian version of utilitarianism, and because I do not think there
is an explicit recognition of utilitarianism as the actual reasons for
action in the making of international economic law and policy.
Quasiutilitarianism has so many problems that I do not know
where to begin.
Distinguishing other ethical theories from
utilitarianism and the broader notion of consequentialism has
been one of the major debating tournaments of modern moral
philosophy, and others far more capable than I have dealt with the
issues in depth. I mention just a few weaknesses of utilitarianism
here because of their relevance to international economic law and
policy. How does quasiutilitarianism work? The main problems
are in average utility, the greatest good for the greatest number,
and in concepts like Pareto efficiency. These measures fail to
account for effects on the worst off. They focus wholly on states of
affairs and not on principles.33 Quasiutilitarianism tends to
engage in an improper aggregation of the effects of a policy into a
single judgment, giving inadequate attention to the distributive
effects of the policy. Aggregation tends to disguise the adverse
effects of a policy on groups who suffer substantial burdens or who
may be worse off in the society in question. Joseph Raz has
provided the example of how a utilitarian must commit to the
claim that an extra lick of ice cream for a sufficiently large number
of people can justify the killing of another person, if the trivial
satisfactions of the many who get the extra lick outweigh the loss
32. I borrow the “quasiutilitarianism” phrase from Carl Cranor, Presentation: The
Genomic Revolution and IntraNational and InterNational Equity (on file with the author).
33. The distinction between a focus on states of affairs or principles is this: In the
dominant quasiutilitarian ways of thinking, people’s preferences, desires and satisfactions
are not analyzable and given, and from these one determines how to increase or maximize
these preferences, desires and satisfactions. In a principlesbased account, we evaluate the
content of these preferences, desires and satisfactions to decide if they are right or wrong, or
good or bad. In an approach based on principles, we might decide that an action is
impermissible even though it may increase the satisfaction of the agent or agents in
question.
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suffered by the person killed.34 Utilitarian and quasiutilitarian
concepts do not link to concepts humans seem to possess of right
and wrong. It is telling that we do not teach our children to be
utilitarian, but rather, we try to instill in them the reasongiving
force of right and wrong.
III. FAIRNESS THEORIES
My project is to set forth some alternatives to the current
default rule of quasiutilitarianism, so that we may better
understand the fairness of international economic law and
institutions. As explained above, the natural starting point for any
such discussion is Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Before I take on the
substantive accounts, some groundwork is necessary.
At the outset, we must be cautious in extending Scanlon’s
version of contractualism to provide an account of public morality.
Scanlon explains that his contractualism applies only to individual
conduct.35 It is intended for application to the basic question that
moral philosophers try to answer, and that is “how should one
live.” The focus of inquiry in contractualism is thus plainly
distinguishable from that of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, which has
as its explicit target an account of a public morality. Rawls
elaborates in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement that his principles
concern “the basic structure of society, that is, its main political
and social institutions and how they fit together into one unified
system of cooperation.”36 Considerable problems may appear in
trying to extend Scanlonionian contractualism from the private to
the public sphere, but considerable promise exists in such an
extension nonetheless. We will have to work out these problems,
or contractualism ultimately will not make the move into the
political and legal realms.
The theories that I discuss all deal in concepts about
principles.37 They do not focus solely on states of affairs, as
economics, utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism do.
Both Rawls and Scanlon blend the two values. They permit a
focus on states of affairs, but states of affairs cannot trump
principles of fairness. Neither theorist is neutral about principles.

34. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 276 (1986).
35. Scanlon expresses this idea implicitly and explicitly throughout What We Owe to
Each Other. For an example of Scanlon contrasting his contractualism with Rawls, see
SCANLON, supra note 7, at 228 (pointing out the application of contractualism to individual
conduct).
36. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 39–40 (Erin Kelly ed. 2001).
37. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the distinction between ethical approaches
that focus on states of affairs versus principles.
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Scanlon starts his influential work on contractualism with an
account that places his theory within descriptivism, but with little
in the way of the metaphysical baggage often associated with such
discussion.38
Rawls’s work is constructivist, although Rawls did not use
that term in A Theory of Justice. In A Theory of Justice, he does
discuss the idea of construction, that his principles of justice
provide “constructive criteria” for guiding action.39
Rawls
distinguishes constructivist from intuitionist approaches. He
argues that intuitionism produces a set of impractical and
unranked moral principles and thus does not help to guide
action.40 Thus, his major distinction is between constructivism
and realism.41 In a constructivist moral theory, moral principles
are not the “fabric of the world.”42 They are not facts independent
of and prior to moral reasoning. However, they have validity and
are correct when they are the product of a procedure in which a
human agent engages in practical reason to articulate and live by
a moral principle. In his Lectures on the History of Modern Moral
Philosophy, Rawls explains that Kant is a constructivist. “An
essential feature of Kant’s moral constructivism is that the
particular categorical imperatives that give the content of the
duties of justice and of virtue are viewed as specified by a
procedure of construction (the CI procedure).”43 Constructivists do
not have to be Kantian. Utilitarians are constructivists, as is the
neoHobbsian David Gauthier.44 Rawls is a Kantian constructivist.
In his 1980 Dewey Lecture, entitled “Kantian Constuctivism in
Moral Theory,” Rawls “‘set out more clearly the Kantian roots of A
Theory of Justice,’ and to elaborate [more clearly] the Kantian form
of constructivism.”45
Rawls is also a contractualist. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
places his work within the social contract tradition of Kant, Locke

38. SCANLON, supra note 7, at 2.
39. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 30. See also Onora O’Neill,
Constructivism Versus Contractualism, 16 RATIO 319, 320 (2003).
40. O’Neill, supra note 39. Rawls makes the same distinctions about Kant. See JOHN
RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 237–38 (Barbara
Herman ed. 2000) [hereinafter LECTURES].
41. I use the word “realism” in its philosophical sense and not as used in legal thought
to refer to legal realism. The two theories are radically different. See, e.g., Michael S.
Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Legal Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871,
872 n.4, 880 (1989).
42. See J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 15 (reprint ed. 1978).
43. RAWLS, LECTURES, supra note 40, at 237.
44. O’Neill, supra note 39, at 320; DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (reprint
ed. 1987).
45. RAWLS, LECTURES, supra note 40, at xiii, quoting John Rawls, Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures, 1980, 77 J. PHIL 515, 515 (1980).
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and Rousseau.46 Scanlon places his work in the tradition of
Rousseau.47 O’Neill argues that we can read Scanlon to be a
constructivist.48 To avoid confusion, I use the contractualist label
to refer to Scanlon and the constructivist label to refer to Rawls.
A. Rawls: Kantian Constructivism
A threshold question is whether we can apply Rawlsian justice
as fairness outside of the confines of domestic society. Rawls
himself refused to extend his theory to international contexts, but
many Rawlsians have argued that the conditions now hold for
application of Rawlsian theory at the international level. I will not
restate those arguments here.49 The extension is justified because
of the lack of economic selfsufficiency and distributional autonomy
between states.50 The WTO and other international economic
institutions no doubt had a hand in bringing these two conditions
into existence.
The Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness is about social
justice or public morality. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explains
that the “primary subject” of his principles “is the basic structure
of society, the arrangement of major social institutions into one
scheme of cooperation.”51 Rawls elaborates in Justice as Fairness:
A Restatement, that his principles concern “the basic structure of
society, that is, its main political and social institutions and how
they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation.”52
These principles, Rawls explains, “are to govern the assignment of
rights and duties in these institutions and they are to determine
the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social
life.”53 They “must not be confused with the principles which apply
to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances.”54
The basic structure of the Rawlsian conception of justice is
that if mutually selfinterested and rational persons stand in
relation to each other behind a veil of ignorance in the original

46. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at xviii.
47. SCANLON, supra note 7, at 5.
48. O’Neill, supra note 39.
49. See, e.g., Garcia, Beyond a Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 6;
Garcia, Building a Just Trade Order, supra note 6; Garcia, Trade and Inequality, supra note
6; BUCHANAN, supra note 27.
50. See Garcia, Beyond a Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 6; Garcia,
Building a Just Trade Order, supra note 6; Garcia, Trade and Inequality, supra note 6;
BUCHANAN, supra note 27, at 200–27.
51. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 47.
52. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 36, at 39–40.
53. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 47.
54. Id.
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position, and if they must choose a conception of the right to order
their claims on society in the circumstances of justice, they will
agree on two lexically ordered principles of justice. The first
principle of justice is that society guarantees “each person . . . an
equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.”55 The
second principle of justice is that society should arrange social and
economic inequalities so that two criteria are met: (1) positions and
offices should be open to everyone equally; and (2) social and
economic inequalities should benefit everyone regardless of social
group.56
The focus in discussions of global economic questions has
mainly been on the second principle, which has clear implications
for assessing the distributive justice of international economic law
and institutions. I, like others, place less emphasis on the first
principle, so we do not have to get into the question of public
reason on mainly noneconomic civil society issues to any great
depth. The first principle, dealing with basic liberties and
freedoms, goes to the heart of sovereignty. It is the subject of
domestic constitutional orders, but also of international human
rights and international criminal law regimes.
As these
international regimes proliferate, some of the responsibilities for
securing the first principle move to the international level. That is
not my concern here. That the first trumps the second is
important for understanding why we should not lightly allow
international legal orders to override fair domestic legal orders.
The first principle retains its lexical priority institutionally to the
extent that governments refuse to agree to treaties that derogate
from basic rights and freedoms provided domestically. Difficulties
may arise, however, if international tribunals, such as the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body, issue decisions that trump basic rights
granted domestically. This is an issue for another article.
Let us look a bit more closely at the second principle. Rawls
contends that if we place persons behind a veil of ignorance in the
original position, they would choose the difference and fair
equality of opportunity principles as principles of equality.57 At
the risk of oversimplifying, the reason for the selection of these
principles in the original position is because Rawls does not want
to base the distribution of primary social goods (rights, liberties,
opportunities, income and wealth) or primary natural goods

55. Id. at 53.
56. Id. See also Carl Cranor, Rawlsian Choice of Distributive Principles (unpublished,
on file with the author).
57. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 130–32.
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(health, intelligence and imagination) on initial endowments
obtained through luck. When they are behind the veil of ignorance
in the original position, people do not know their endowments of
these goods. The second principle permits inequality, and persons
can use their unequal endowments to their own benefit, as long as
institutions provide incentives to benefit everyone, particularly the
worst off. Let us unpack this second principle. It itself contains
two principles, the fair equality of opportunity principle and the
difference principle.
The fair equality of opportunity principle holds that positions
and offices that result in social and economic inequalities must be
open to all. It does not assume or ensure that everyone is equal in
talents, abilities and motivation. But, for individuals who are
equal in talents, abilities and motivations, they should have an
equal chance of attaining the same positions in a given society.
Under the fair equality of opportunity principle, social and, in our
context here, national starting points are irrelevant because they
are arbitrary.
The difference principle essentially provides that inequality
must benefit everyone. Inequality is fair only if it benefits the
least advantaged. As long as the primary social goods of the worst
off group are increasing, inequality is fair and can continue to
increase. As soon as the primary social goods of the worstoff
group stop increasing, then the society in question has reached the
maximum inequality permitted. We can add other groups into this
picture. Suppose the benefits to the worstoff group plateau, but
society could continue to make the bestoff group (or any betteroff
group) better off with no detriment to the worstoff group. Is such
a move fair? Inequality can continue, but we have to examine the
effects on other groups. Consider the secondworstoff group. If,
during increasing inequality, the lot of the secondworstoff group
is increasing, so long as society does not make the worstoff group
even worse off, inequality can continue to increase. The point at
which increasing inequality must stop is at the point at which
society could make no more moves without making the worstoff
group or the secondworstoff group better off. We can generalize
the account to any number of groups. The emerging concept is the
difference principle: a scheme of cooperation is fair if, in the given
historical and social circumstances, society can make no further
move that would make all (every one) of the representative groups
better off.58 In other words, pick a regime of norms that makes

58.

Id. at 65–72.
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everyone better off than they would be under any other regime of
norms.
Rawls’s theory of justice combines two prevailing approaches
to moral theory.
It is principled.
It has a procedure of
construction for determining the content of fairness. The veil of
ignorance and original position is a universalizing procedure, as is
Kant’s categorical imperative procedure. Rawls uses principles to
evaluate states of affairs. In this way his theory is a hybrid.
Rawls does not rely solely on the analysis of states of affairs, as
utilitarianism does, but states of affairs are important in assessing
the lot of groups in society, particularly those worst off. As we
shall see in the following part, Scanlon’s contractualism shares
this hybrid feature.
The relevance of Rawls’s theory of justice to the normativity of
international economic law and institutions is remarkable. There
is no wonder that so many have extended Rawls to the
international realm.
B. Scanlon: Contractualism
In 1982, T. M. Scanlon published an influential article entitled
“Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in which he first proposed
his contractualist account of morality.59 He since wrote a book on
contractualism, What We Owe to Each Other, which revised some
of his views, partly in response to critics.60 Contractualism has
gotten quite a bit of attention in moral philosophical circles, and it
is worth investigating its application to institutions. I will not
present anything like a complete account of contractualism here. I
want to get to the structure of the contractualist argument, to
understand its application. The metaethical, epistemological and
metaphysical questions are for discussion in other venues. Despite
the lack of an explicit link to the political realm, I think a good use
of contractualism is as a heuristic for evaluating global economic
treaties. Contractualism is an ethical framework that has the
potential to produce increased attention to fairness in the global
economic order.
Scanlon states the basic working principle of contractualism
as follows: “an act is wrong if its performance under the
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the
general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject

59. T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND
103 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, eds. 1982).
60. SCANLON, supra note 7.
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as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”61 Scanlon
prefers the negative formulation to the affirmative “that everyone
could reasonably accept” because “[u]nanimous acceptance is a
consequence of this condition’s being fulfilled, but is not itself the
basic idea.”62 Scanlon did not intend to formulate anything like a
Paretooptimality requirement.
Cohen has argued that an
equivalent formulation for “no one could reasonably reject” would
be “everyone must reasonably accept.”63 Arguably, these phrases
are equivalent, but it is best to use the phrase adopted by Scanlon,
since it is his theory.
In contractualism, the basis for moral wrongness or rightness
lies in mutual recognition, a kind of mutuality. Mutual recognition
lies in the motivational basis for contractualism. Scanlon’s
contractualism is not Hobbesian.
People do not enter into
agreement out of any reasons of selfinterest.64 Scanlon explains:
What distinguishes my view from other accounts
involving ideas of agreement is its conception of the
motivational basis of this agreement. The parties
whose agreement is in question are assumed not
merely to be seeking some kind of advantage but
also to be moved by the aim of finding principles that
others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably
reject.65
Contractualism reflects “[t]he idea of a shared willingness to
modify our private demands in order to find a basis of justification
that others also have reason to accept.”66 The philosophical
lineage of Scanlon’s contractualism goes back to Rousseau, not
Hobbes.67
A key aspect of Scanlon’s contractualism is its justification
requirement. Justification is necessary to his theory in two ways:
first as a normative basis for determining the content of morality
— for determining right and wrong — and, second, as a way of
characterizing that content.68 The focus of characterization is in
something like a constructivist procedure in determining rightness
61. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 390, n.8.
63. Brad W. Hooker, Scanlon’s Contractualism, Address at University College London,
Department of Political Science, School of Public Policy (Nov. 4, 2002), at http://www.
ucl.ac.uk/spp/download/seminars/0203/Scanlons_Contractualism.rtf.
64. For a contemporary Hobbesian account see Gauthier, supra note 44.
65. SCANLON, supra note 7, at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 189.
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or wrongness based on justification to others.69 In this sense,
Scanlonian contractualism does not need a veil of ignorance. The
veil is unnecessary because contractualism internalizes the
requirement of justifiability in the reasonable rejection standard.
The concept of avoiding a bias of selfinterest exists in the
requirement of taking action that others could not reasonably
reject.
The motivational basis for the reasonable rejection
requirement already requires that agents consider others. Scanlon
does not need to impose a veil of ignorance requirement in order to
get to the point where people will take others into account.70 The
lack of connection to Hobbes seems clear.
Contractualism accounts for morality in a narrow sense. It
does not concern morality in a broader sense, where it has to do
with a range of issues of individual moral conduct that do no harm
or violate any duties to others.71 For example, contractualism does
no work towards helping us understand whether harming the
environment in and of itself is morally wrong. Its scope is limited
to a narrower range of morality, with duties we owe to others.
Harm to the environment is a value to the extent it is, within a
reasonable rejection framework, harm to others. Reasons for
rejection are personal, but their force as reasons may depend on
impersonal value, say, if people are of the view that protection of
the environment is worthwhile.72
Scanlon argues that
contractualism nevertheless applies to a broader range of human
action than justice does because justice has to do with social
institutions.73 His interpretation of justice as outside the realm of
the practical reason of individual agents seems questionable, but I
think he is simply trying to cabin contractualism as something
that applies to individual or private circumstances.
Scanlon provides guidance as to the form of a contractualist
argument. Consider the situation in which an agent must
determine whether it is wrong to do X in circumstances C. First,
“deciding whether an action is right or wrong requires a
substantive judgment on our part about whether certain objections
to possible moral principles would be reasonable.”74 From here, we
must look at burdens and benefits. To determine what is
reasonably rejectable by others, “we need . . . to form an idea of the
burdens that would be imposed on some people in such a situation

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

207.
6–7.
220.
194.
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if others were permitted to do X.”75 Scanlon calls these “objections
to permission.”76 We must compare objections to permission to
“objections to prohibition,” which focus on benefits to others.77 We
then can compare these two sorts of objections to derive a
judgment about whether X is morally permissible. Scanlon
explains:
If the objections to permission are strong enough,
compared to the objections to prohibition, to make it
reasonable to reject any principle permitting doing X
in C, then one would not expect the objections to
prohibition to be strong enough, compared to the
objections to permission, to make it reasonable to
reject any principle that forbids doing X in C.78
In contractualism, objections derive from principles, not
merely from effects or states of affairs.79 This does not mean that
principles cannot take states of affairs into account. The degree of
harm a principle causes is directly relevant to its fairness.
Individuals can reasonably object if they are overly burdened.
Contractualism, however, does not focus solely on states of affairs;
principles guide any consideration of states of affairs. The focus is
on why an action is wrong. Reasons are thus paramount. This
sort of thinking should not be exceptional to lawyers. For example,
we would consider accidental harm different from intentional
harm, even if the effects were the same. In determining whether
to build a road or a school or an electrical transmitter, we accept
the nonnegligent injury or even death of a limited number of
workers and possibly bystanders as socially acceptable risk. We
can even determine with some degree of statistical confidence that
such injuries or deaths will occur. On the other hand, the law does
not accept intentional harm inflicted on a few people so that many
will benefit. Scanlon offers the example of electrical equipment
falling on the arm of a worker in a transmitter room of a television
station broadcasting a World Cup match. We certainly would not
sanction the failure to remove the worker from harm in order to
continue the broadcast. We would want to rescue her before the
match is over.80
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id. at 195.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 33 (discussing the distinction between ethical approaches based on
states of affairs versus principles).
80. SCANLON, supra note 7, at 235–36.
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We can understand the nature of objections to permission and
prohibition is in what Derek Parfit’s characterization of
Scanlonian contractualism as a “Complaint Model” of ethical
decisionmaking.81 In the Complaint Model, only individuals can
raise objections, which means that there can be no aggregation or
summing of costs and benefits, because such aggregation or
summing can result in the burdening of some groups to benefit
others. Scanlon explains:
A contractualist theory, in which all objections to a
principle must be raised by individuals, blocks such
justifications in an intuitively appealing way. It
allows the intuitively compelling complaints of those
who are severely burdened to be heard, while, on the
other side, the sum of the smaller benefits to others
has no justificatory weight, since there is no
individual who enjoys these benefits and would have
to forgo them if the policy were disallowed.82
Utilitarianism permits aggregation, but contractualism does not,
except in a very narrow range of circumstances involving “ties.” A
tie is a situation in which the moral seriousness of, say, two states
of affairs is equivalent, but one situation involves harm to more
people than the other does. In such a situation, it is permissible to
choose the alternative that causes harm to the fewer number of
persons. In situations not involving ties, which Scanlon seems to
think are the overwhelming majority of situations, we must look to
principles to choose the appropriate course of action.83
Scanlon gives us some hint on how we could apply his
contractualist principle to questions about global justice. In a
section of his book on whether there should be a priority for the
worst off, Scanlon elaborates two principles — the Rescue
Principle and the Principle of Helpfulness.84 Both have as their
scope the question whether a duty to render aid exists. Aid
rendering duties have been the subject of longstanding questions
of Kantians, consequentialists and virtue ethicists. The basic
points of discussion are: (1) how otherregarding should I be?; (2)
do I have to depart from my own life projects to aid others?; and (3)
can I consider my own interests?

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
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Scanlon contends that in some cases the question of a priority
of the worstoff never arises.85 His example is the obligation to
keep a promise, a subject he devotes a good bit of discussion to in
his book.
Therefore, as a preliminary matter, it seems
contractualism will excuse from the discussion of distributive
justice any preexisting obligations. Scanlon does not say much
about this limitation. It has the potential to be a very significant
limitation and is worthy of future exploration.
Scanlon says that a principle of priority for those worst off
“has greater plausibility when we turn from principles whose aim
is to create some specific form of protection or assurance to
principles which tell us how we should distribute some
transferable good, in cases in which the value of this good to
potential beneficiaries is the dominant consideration.”86 The cases
in which it is most clearly wrong not to give aid are cases in which
others are in serious difficulties, where “their lives are
immediately threatened, . . . they are starving, . . . in great pain, or
living in conditions of bare subsistence.”87 He articulates his
Rescue Principle for these cases: “if you are presented with a
situation in which you can prevent something very bad from
happening, or alleviate someone’s dire plight, by making only a
slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to
do so.”88 Thus, it would be unreasonable for me to reject a moral
duty to give a charitable contribution to the victims of the recent
tsunami. The Principle of Helpfulness, on the other hand, applies
when someone else not in dire need would benefit from my help,
and my help would mean a slight to moderate sacrifice on my
part.89
Do these principles seem weak? They try to steer away from
the problem faced by moral (but not legal) utilitarianism that it
asks too much of agents. Scanlon allows us to consider our own
life plans. Scanlon argues that it would be reasonable to reject a
principle requiring us to give no more weight to our own interests
than to the “similar interests” of others.90 He explains, “[w]hat is
appealed to is not the weight of my interests or yours but rather
the generic reasons that everyone in the position of an agent has
for not wanting to be bound, in general, by such a strict
requirement.”91
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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Of course, we must be fair to Scanlon here. His discussion is
limited to the question of whether individuals — not governments
— have a duty to render aid. The public international analogue is
aid and development assistance, though we should not jump to the
analogy without providing proper reasons for the extension of
contractualism from the private to the public sphere. We cannot
suggest his principles as anything other than heuristics for
evaluation of WTO (or other) policies and institutions without
some account of how contractualism is a public form of morality,
something of sufficiently broad scope that it is the subject for
another article. The most glaring omission in contractualism as it
stands now is a theory of justice about public institutions. The
bottom line for contractualism is that, in contrast to Rawls’s theory
of justice, a “‘priority for the worst off’ . . . is a feature of certain
particular moral contexts rather than a general structural feature
of contractualist moral argument.”92 Scanlon admits that such a
priority is a central feature of Rawls’s difference principle, but he
is careful to explain that Rawls “starts from the idea that…equal
participants in a [fair] system of social cooperation . . . have a
prima facie claim to an equal share in the benefits it creates.”93 In
his constructivist account, Rawls tries to neutralize luck created in
the natural lottery of birth, nationality and so on. Contractualism,
lacking a political idea of equality, makes no claims about equality
or initial endowments.
Do we want to extend contractualism into the public realm, to
evaluate in our particular case the fairness of global economic
treaties? Some scholars, such as Leif Wenar, contend that
contractualism is adequate but that the main task of the
contractualist is empirical and not philosophical. He argues that
“[i]f the causal links are good — that is, if rich individuals can in
fact improve the longterm wellbeing of the poor and their
descendants through direct action with their time and money —
then contractualism may place on rich individuals quite significant
demands.”94 Wenar’s argument is good as far as it goes for the
construction of a moral principle in the realm of private morality,
but I believe that we need to do more work to get an adequate
account of contractualism to compare with Rawls’s theory of
justice. For now, we can use Scanlon’s principles as heuristics.

92. Id. at 228.
93. Id.
94. Leif Wenar, Contractualism and Global Economic Justice, in G LOBAL JUSTICE 78
(Thomas W. Pogge, ed. 2001).
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IV. A SKETCH OF HOW TO APPLY FAIRNESS CRITERIA: TRIPS AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES
In his article, “Global Economics and International Economic
Law,” Jackson explains that “[d]istributive justice suggests a
variety of policies within the scope of a domestic market:
progressive taxation, welfare, safety nets, a social market
economy, etc. However, internationally, of course, we have this
problem also: the developing countries argue for certain
preferences.”95 Frank Garcia has done important work on the
application of Rawlsian principles of fairness to special and
differential treatment.96 The next steps are to evaluate the basic
policies and normative structures in the WTO agreements and
international economic institutions generally.
As for normative structures, a place to start is in
understanding the fairness of the most basic of the traditional
tools of the trade lawyer — national treatment and most favored
nation (MFN) obligations. When is national treatment or MFN
reasonably rejectable by a WTO member? Quotas are also an
obvious target of analysis.
From these basic disciplines, we could move to examining non
tariff barriers to trade and areas of substantive regulation. TRIPS
and the Sanitary and PhytoSanitary Agreement seem apt for
some sort of contractualist analysis. Subsidies are another area in
which a fairness analysis could tell us much. The recent Upland
Cotton decision, in which the WTO Appellate Body upheld a ruling
by a dispute settlement panel that U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers
in part violated the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement and distorted trade, suggests a subject for further
inquiry using Scanlonian or Rawlsian principles.97 We could also
assess the fairness of the WTO dispute settlement process itself
using these principles. We could gain insights by using the tools of
moral philosophy to understand, for example, the effects of dispute
settlement policies on lowincome countries or on inadequately
represented groups. In addition to the need for a philosophical
account to transition Scanlonian (and other) ethical theories to
conceptions of political justice, the next steps are empirical:

95. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 451 (2000).
96. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, supra
note 6.
97. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R ¶ 763(Mar. 3, 2005) (upholding a dispute settlement panel ruling that U.S.
subsidies to cotton farmers distorted trade and partly violated the subsidies and
countervailing measures agreement).
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institutionally oriented studies of the details of the world trading
system.
Here, I examine the effect of TRIPS on access to medicines in
lowincome countries. The subject of access to medicines has
received a good deal of attention. The attention focuses on the
devastation that disease has brought to lowincome countries,
particularly countries in subSaharan Africa.98
Intellectual
property rights are but one feature of the global health delivery
system, one that is isolable and relates directly to the work of the
WTO.
In this analysis, I do not treat WTO members as
“individuals” or “groups.” Rather, the focus of inquiry is on
representative groups in and across societies. This approach is
Rawlsian in orientation, but extended beyond domestic political
borders.
The link between poverty, poor health, and access to medicines
is indisputable. According to a report written by the Commission
on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) for the World Health
Organization, “[t]he linkages of health to poverty reduction and to
longterm economic growth are powerful, much stronger than is
generally understood. The burden of disease in some lowincome
regions, especially subSaharan Africa, stands as a stark barrier to
economic growth . . . .”99 The main causes of avoidable deaths in
the least developed countries are the result of “HIV/AIDS, malaria,
tuberculosis (TB), childhood infectious diseases, maternal and
perinatal conditions,” deficiencies in nutrition and illness related
to tobacco use.100 Many of these diseases are preventable or
curable.101 CMH estimates that if developed countries were to
allocate only 0.1 percent of their GNP to assistance in health care,
they could save 8 million lives per year in lowincome countries. 102
The CMH report explains:
This program would yield economic benefits vastly
greater than its costs. Eight million lives saved from
infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies
would translate into a far larger number of years of
life saved for those affected, as well as higher quality
of life. Economists talk of disabilityadjusted life

98. See, e.g., BERYL LEACH ET AL., PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT:
INCREASING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT TASK FORCE ON HIV/AIDS,
MALARIA, TB & ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 25 (2005).
99. WHO Comm’n on Macroeconomics and Health, Macroeconomics and Health:
Investing in Health for Economic Development 1 (Dec. 20, 2001).
100. Id. at 2.
101. See id. at 3.
102. Id. at 11–12.
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years (DALYs) saved, which add together the
increased years of life and the reduced years of
living with disabilities.
We estimate that
approximately 330 million DALYs would be saved
for each 8 million deaths prevented. Assuming,
conservatively, that each DALY saved gives an
economic benefit of 1 year’s per capita income of a
projected $563 in 2015, the direct economic benefit of
saving 330 million DALYs would be $186 billion per
year, and plausibly several times that. Economic
growth would also accelerate, and thereby the saved
DALYs would help to break the poverty trap that
has blocked economic growth in highmortality low
income countries. This would add tens or hundreds
of billions of dollars more per year through increased
per capita incomes.103
Malaria, a preventable disease, all but eradicated in the North,
continues to plague the South and correlates strongly to poverty
and poor economic growth.104
Some consider access to medicines a human right. The UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the World Health
Organization accept this approach.105
Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
recognizes “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health.”106
Rights arguments are imprecise because they tell us nothing
about obligations and requirements, and of course, intellectual
property rights holders have rights that may conflict with the
nebulous human right to health. Rights talk has gotten us little.
The international human rights covenants require ratifying
countries to conform their domestic laws to the covenants.
However, countries do not have to ratify these covenants. Indeed,
the United States has not ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.107 There has been some
argument in the human rights literature that some countries, such
103.
104.

Id. at 12–13 (endnotes omitted).
John Luke Gallup & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Economic Burden of Malaria, 64 A M. J.
TROPICAL MED. HYGIENE 85, 85–86 (2001).
105. WTO, Draft Cancún Ministerial Text of 12 September 2003, WT/MIN(03)/20
(2003).
106. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
107. U.N. Office of the High Comm’n for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the
Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of 09 June 2004, available at
http://193.194.138.190/pdf/report.pdf.
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as the United States, will not ratify a human rights covenant
unless its laws already conform to the covenant, though the
findings are far from unequivocal108 Even if a country ratified the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and this ratification mandated improvements to health care in the
country, it would impose no obligations on the country to seek to
improve access to health care in other countries. These arguably
weak human rights regimes contrast starkly to the strong
intellectual property rights protection in TRIPS, which is
mandatory if a country is a WTO member.109 TRIPS is a
multilateral agreement; all WTO members must comply, though
lowincome countries had more time to achieve compliance as a
result of transition periods contained in TRIPS.
TRIPS
obligations, moreover, are enforced through the considerable
bureaucratic and dispute settlement infrastructure of the WTO
Secretariat.
Below, I show how rights arguments are by
themselves inadequate and how alternative formulations, based on
requirements and obligations, might improve distributive justice
across countries. Whether obligations on one person or set of
persons gives rights to others I leave for future discussion.
A. TRIPS and the Doha Declaration
Property rights have been a prime area of controversy for
several centuries. It would be difficult to challenge the argument
that no other category of legal rules affects the distribution of
wealth more than property rules. Hume postulated that the
central reason people engage in society is for stability in the
possession of property.110 His reason looks very much like what
rational choice theorists characterize as Nash equilibrium. The
political economics of British agriculture in seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries worked to produce the enclosure movement in
Britain, the socalled first enclosure movement, in which the

108. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935 (2002). Cf. Kenneth Roth, The Charade of U.S. Ratification of International
Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347 (2000).
109. TRIPS is a multilateral agreement, which means that a WTO member must accept
and comply with it. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, art. 4, (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/03fa_e.htm, (last visited May 16, 2006). Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, arts. II(2), XVI, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/04wto_e.htm (last visited May 16, 2006).
110. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 314 (David Fate Norton & Mary
J. Norton eds., Oxford University Press 2000) (1739–40).
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monarchy enclosed commons areassuch as copyholds of the
yeomanry to expropriate the rights of small farmers in estates.111
While the battle in the first enclosure movement was over
rights in agricultural land, the battle in the second enclosure
movement is over rights in intangible products of the mind, which
includes pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.112 The contested
rights are in intellectual property.113 Similes and metaphors
abound in the literature. We are in the process of the second
enclosure movement the “enclosure of the intangible commons of
the mind”114 and the “intellectual landgrab.”115 The battle for
rights in intellectual property is “an information arms
race . . . with multiple sides battling for larger shares of the global
knowledge pool.”116 The enclosure of the intellectual commons is
occurring in various disciplines of science and technology,
including information technology, cyberspace, and biotechnology
relating to pharmaceuticals, medicine, and human genetics.117
TRIPS is one of the most important international agreements
relevant to the allocation of intellectual property rights in
pharmaceuticals. Although an international trade agreement and
not a domestic intellectual property law, TRIPS is relevant to
ownership of rights in pharmaceuticals. It specifies standards for
the intellectual property laws of the WTO members. It is unlike
any other trade agreement preceding it, unlike anything produced
in the WTO framework since the GATT’s humble beginnings as an
agreement to regulate tariffs. TRIPS harmonizes intellectual
property protection at a high level of protection for rights holders,
which is one of its controversial characteristics.
The WTO members negotiated TRIPS from 1986 to mid1994
as part of the Uruguay Round.118 It is one of the most important
developments in the WTO regime. TRIPS has been described as
“the most ambitious international intellectual property convention

111. Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright
and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELELY TECH. L. J. 777, 786–89 (2000).
112. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47
Duke L.J. 87, 95 (1997).
116. Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a
CommonPool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 111 (2003).
117. For a broad ranging discussion of the issues see Conference on the Public Domain,
Duke Law School, Nov. 911, http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
118. See JEFFERY J. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BUURMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN
ASSESSMENT (1994).
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ever attempted”119 and as “the most comprehensive multilateral
agreement on intellectual property.”120
It would not be an
exaggeration to say that in the Uruguay Round, multilateral co
operation in the WTO regime on intellectual property matters
transformed from a casual indifference to an intense preference for
rigorous standards. TRIPS does much more than impose the
traditional WTO obligations of MFN and national treatment. It is
the first international trade agreement to specify minimum
standards of protection and universal coverage of intellectual
property rights. It imposes positive obligations on WTO members
to protect seven categories of intellectual property.121
The
standards in TRIPS reflect the high standards of intellectual
property protection typically found in the intellectual property
laws of highincome countries.122 In effect, TRIPS harmonizes
intellectual property protection. Lowincome countries must meet
the same standards as developed countries, although under the
transition provisions of the Agreement they had more time in
which to achieve compliance with the Agreement. Developed
countries had until January 1, 1996 to achieve compliance,
developing countries had until January 1, 2000, and the least
developed countries had until January 1, 2006.123 In addition to
high substantive standards that all WTO members must follow,
TRIPS mandates untried procedural requirements for enforcing
intellectual property rights. TRIPS directs WTO members on the
details of how their enforcement system is supposed to enforce
intellectual property rights within their borders.124 Moreover,
disputes between WTO members over compliance with TRIPS are
decided in the WTO dispute settlement system.125
Two sets of TRIPS provisions are especially relevant to the
affordable medicines debate: those dealing with patents and those
dealing with compulsory licensing. First, TRIPS requires that
WTO members make patents lasting for at least twenty years from
the date of the filing of the patent application available for “any
119. J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a
Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363, 366 (1996).
120. WTO, Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited May 9, 2006).
121. Reichman, supra note 119, at 366 n.12.
122. See Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 121 (1994); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
123. Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 81 arts. 65–66 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
124. Id. arts. 41–62.
125. Id. arts. 63–64.

208

J. OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:2

inventions, whether products or processes.”126 The pharmaceutical
industry was particularly interested in having TRIPS require that
all WTO members protect product patents. India, for example, has
a long history of not recognizing product patents. India is a low
income country with many individuals paying health care
expenses outofpocket.127 For many years India’s substantial
pharmaceuticals industry — in 2002 the largest producer of
generic drugs in terms of volume — focused on reverse engineering
pharmaceuticals and on producing inexpensive drugs for a low
income population.128 Drug prices were in India thousands of
percent lower than the patent protecting prices in higher income
countries.129 To comply with TRIPS, India had to amend its patent
law to recognize product patents. In 2002, India amended its
patent law to conform to TRIPS. The Patents (Amendment) Act of
2002, which went into effect in May 2003, recognizes twentyyear
product patents on pharmaceuticals.130
Compulsory licensing is a concept known principally outside of
the United States.
It is a license to produce “a patented
product . . . over the objection of the patent holder.” 131 The license
may run either to a government or to a user the government
authorizes. TRIPS authorizes compulsory licensing but imposes a
number of conditions. Before undertaking compulsory licensing, a
government must try, “within a reasonable period of time,” to
negotiate “reasonable commercial terms” from the rights holder.132
A WTO member may waive these requirements in the event of a
“national emergency.”133 Any use of the compulsory license must
be “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market” of the
WTO member.134 Finally, the right holder must be paid “adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into
account the economic value of the authorization.”135
The WTO members held the Doha Ministerial Conference in
late 2001. In that ministerial conference, the WTO members
agreed on November 14, 2001 to the “Declaration on the TRIPS
126. TRIPS, supra note 123, art. 27.
127. See Shubham Chaudhuri, et al., The Effects of Extending Intellectual Property
Rights Protection to Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical
Market 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10159,
2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10159.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
“Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 52 (2002).
132. TRIPS, supra note 123, art. 31(b).
133. Id.
134. Id. art. 31(f).
135. Id. art. 1(h).
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Agreement and Public Health.” 136 The socalled Doha Declaration
states that the WTO members “recognize the gravity of the public
health problems afflicting many developing and leastdeveloped
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics”137 and “stress the need” for TRIPS to
be “part of the wider national and international action to address
these problems.”138 On the other hand, the Declaration recognizes
that “intellectual property protection is important for the
development of new medicines,” and “the concerns about its effects
on prices.”139 The WTO members agreed that TRIPS “does not and
should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health” and that TRIPS “can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.”140 The Declaration contains the following steps
that are more concrete:
(1)“Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses
and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such
licenses are granted.”141 This section informs that compulsory
licensing is a matter of national discretion.142
(2)“Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it
being understood that public health crises, including those relating
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.”143 This section provides that the current health crises in
the lowincome countries are “national emergencies” and that
negotiations with rights holders before issuing compulsory licenses
is unnecessary.
(3)“The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that
are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to
leave each member free to establish its own regime for such
exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national
treatment provisions . . . .”144 This provision provides that WTO

136. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M.
746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
137. Id. art. 1.
138. Id. art. 2.
139. Id. art. 3.
140. Id. art. 4.
141. Id. art. 5(b).
142. Sykes, supra note 131, at 9.
143. Doha Declaration, supra note 136, art. 5(c).
144. Id. art. 5(d).
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members may permit parallel imports so long as they are not
discriminatory.145
(4)The last section of the Declaration, among other things,
“reaffirm[s] the commitment of developedcountry members to
provide incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote
and encourage technology transfer to leastdeveloped country
members pursuant to Article 66.2.”146
The Declaration left open for future work by the TRIPS
Council the problem of lack of pharmaceutical manufacturing
capability in some low income countries.147 Compulsory licensing
would not help alleviate public health crises in a country lacking
the capability to produce drugs. The TRIPS Council was required
to report to the General Council by the end of May 2002.148 The
outcome of this additional work was a Decision of the General
Council on 30 August 2003, allowing least developed countries and
countries that notify the WTO of their lack of capability to import
pharmaceutical products from eligible countries.149 The conditions
for such exporting and importing are strict. I will not go into the
details of the Decision here because they do not affect the analysis
to follow.
B. Refocusing Towards Principles and Obligations
From an economic standpoint, it is widely held that strong
global intellectual property rights have questionable welfare
effects. From an economic standpoint, TRIPS might be welfare
reducing and rent shifting, with the rents shifting from the poor to
the rich. It is not at all clear that intellectual property rights are
necessary for innovation.150 I will not spend time explaining these
economic points, as others have spent a good deal of effort on them.
Add to these findings of normative welfare economists the findings
of political economists, who argue that TRIPS is the product of

145. Sykes, supra note 131, at 9.
146. Doha Declaration, supra note 136, art. 7.
147. Id. art. 6
148. Id.
149. World Trade Organization General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2006).
150. For examples of the burgeoning literature, see Chaudhuri et al., supra note 127;
Michael Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Intellectual Property, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 209 (2002); Michael Boldrin & Daniel K. Levine, The Economics of
Ideas and Intellectual Property, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES (forthcoming 2006).
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industry capture,151 and we certainly have a questionable state of
affairs even from an efficiency point of view.
Part of the problem is a poverty of discourse, stemming from
the focus on property rights. The contentious compulsory licensing
permissions coming from Doha are an example of how property
rights arguments skew the debate. We have to talk about
derogations from those rights and go through all sorts of efforts to
get derogations. Furthermore, what if the proproperty rights
lobby is right as to particular lifesaving drugs? What if the
derogations, or some of them, harm innovation in particular cases?
An intellectual property rights regime by itself is an
incomplete solution. Focusing also on obligations or requirements
could allow for institutional design that stimulates innovation
while simultaneously providing for access to medicines in low
income countries.
1. The Rawlsian Approach
Though this article introduces a Scanlonian approach to
examining the question of fairness of trade agreements, we should
also examine how a Rawlsian approach might fare. Let us apply
Rawls’s second principle to the problems associated with
intellectual property rights and affordable medicines. This second
principle itself contains two principles, the fair equality of
opportunity principle and the difference principle. We will not be
able to come up with definitive answers because we need more
empirical work, but we can put forth a framework for carrying on
the analysis and reach tentative conclusions.
Here is how the analysis would proceed in determining
whether TRIPS contravenes the fair equality of opportunity
principle. In the context of the substantial need for affordable
medicines in the lowincome countries, the important question is
whether TRIPS results in or contributes to overprotection of
intellectual property rights. It results in overprotection to the
extent that the rights that it creates and protects impair what
Norman Daniels calls normal species functioning. According to
Daniels, “impairments of normal species functioning reduce the
range of opportunity we have within which to construct lifeplans
and conceptions of the good we have a reasonable expectation of

151. The literature is substantial, but for a recent work on public choice and the
proliferation of intellectual property rights generally, see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Political Economics of Intellectual Property Law, AEIBROOKINGS JOINT
CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES (2004), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_Landes.pdf
(last visited May 9, 2006).
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finding satisfying or happinessproducing.”152 Daniels defines
health care broadly. He divides heath care needs into five
categories:
(1) adequate nutrition, shelter
(2) sanitary, safe, unpolluted living and working conditions
(3) exercise, rest, and other features of healthy lifestyles
(4) preventive, curative, and rehabilitative personal medical
services
(5) nonmedical personal (and social) support services.153
He accepts that normal species functioning may vary across
countries. For our purposes, however, the variance does not
matter since the focus here is on basic health care. If over
protection of property rights in TRIPS impairs these goods or their
functional equivalents, then TRIPS violates the fair equality of
opportunity principle.
The focus on affordable medicines in lowincome countries is
on Daniels’ fourth category, the availability of medical services,
including access to medicines to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria,
tuberculosis and other diseases common in lowincome countries.
To the extent that TRIPS impairs the ability of persons in low
income countries to obtain medicines of this sort, it violates the
fair equality of opportunity principle. To meet the fair equality of
opportunity principle, it is not required that these medicines be
“free” or without cost to users. Rather, they should not be so costly
as to unreasonably impair the life plans of individuals in the
countries in question. In short, they should be affordable, with
affordability determined based on some sort or means testing.
Though more research directly on these questions is necessary,
the tentative evidence suggests that the fair equality of
opportunity principle is not met in many situations in the low
income countries. Prices that are “patent protecting” make many
drugs out of reach of persons in many representative groups in the
lowincome countries. Risking an oversimplified picture of an
otherwise rich contracting and firm structure, consumers (which
may be governments in countries where a public health system is
the primary buyer of drugs) typically buy drugs from three kinds of
sellers. First, they buy from the drug manufacturers themselves.
This first avenue requires importing either from the firms who
hold the patents for the drugs or from firms licensed by the patent
152. Norman Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 146, 154 (1981). See also NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985).
153. Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, supra note 152, at 158.
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holder to produce the drugs. Second, they import from a generic
manufacturer located outside the country, who might make the
drug without any license from the patent holder, a possible
solution only prior to when TRIPS came into full force. Third, they
could buy the drugs from producers inside their own borders, who
do not necessarily hold any license from the patent holder. India,
for example, prior to bringing its patent system into compliance
with TRIPS, could produce drugs cheaply and generically because
it did not recognize product patents. TRIPS essentially collapses
all these transaction forms into one: purchases from patent holders
or their authorized producers.
Doha provides some limited
exceptions for compulsory licensing but it is too early to assess its
effect.
The UN Millennium Project Task Force on HIV/AIDS,
Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines has found TRIPS
to be problematic. It describes as a barrier to the development of
affordable new medicines the following:
(TRIPS) . . . may block access to affordable new
medicines and vaccines. After January 2005, generic
production in India, the source of many vital existing
medicines for developing countries without
productive capabilities, will be fully subject to TRIPS
provisions . . . . Concerns also exist that the August
30, 2003, decision reached by the WTO General
Council concerning a waiver for TRIPS Article 31(f)
(which would allow a compulsory license to be
issued by the country in need and by the country
that can produce the medicine for export) will be too
cumbersome for developing countries to exploit . . . .
Finally, the growing number of bilateral and
regional trade agreements with major trading
partners, such as the United States and the
European Union, may often contain provisions that
limit developing countries’ use of existing
flexibilities under TRIPS to protect public health
(such as restrictive compulsory licensing conditions
and parallel importation provisions, extended data
protection, and requiring medicines regulatory
agencies to take on national patent office oversight
duties).154

154.

LEACH ET AL., supra note 98, at 24.
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This article provides only a sketch of how to apply the
Rawlsian criteria and therefore it does not provide any sort of
statistical correlation between normal species functioning and
drug prices, though the connection seems clear enough for some
tentative conclusions. The logic is as follows: illness is a major
reason why people in lowincome countries are poor.155 People in
lowincome countries are ill in large part because they cannot
afford drugs to prevent or cure disease. Finally, they cannot afford
drugs because of high patent protecting prices. The WHO has
found:
The consequences of this inadequacy include an
enormous loss of life from preventable or treatable
diseases (such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, acute
respiratory infections, malaria, diabetes, and
hypertension) and significant human suffering,
particularly among the poor and marginalized
populations of the world. The lack of access to life
saving and healthsupporting medicines for more
than 2 billion poor people stands as a direct
contradiction to the fundamental principle of health
as a human right. Illness is a major reason that the
nearly poor slide into profound poverty. Illness
decreases people’s ability to work (be it
remunerative or not). Illness orphans children and
prevents them from getting the education they need.
Women and children make up the majority of the
poor, and their low status in many societies often
means that they have even less access to medicines.
Improving access to medicines must be a key
component of strategies to strengthen healthcare.156
The WHO estimates that onethird of the world’s population, about
1.7 billion people, lack access to the most basic essential
medicines.157 In the poorest countries this figure increases to one
half.158 The WHO and the United Kingdom Department of
Finance and International Development (DFID) have estimated
that proper access to medicines would save about 4 million lives
155. There may be a variety of other nontrade reasons contributing to poor health in
lowincome countries. The point here is that patent protecting prices are a major
contributing reason. The literature seems clear on this point. See supra notes 97, 98, 126
and accompanying text.
156. LEACH ET AL., supra note 98, at 24.
157. Id. at 25.
158. Id.
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annually.159 From the standpoint of burdens on worstoff groups,
the poorest of the poor pay the highest outofpocket expenses for
medicines.160 Public sectors in developing countries cannot provide
affordable medicines reliably.161 Medical insurance schemes cover
only eight percent of the population in Africa and these schemes
may not cover prescription medicines.162 The DFID has found a
“‘mismatch between pharmaceutical needs in developing countries
and the current nature of the global pharmaceutical market.’” 163
This mismatch is the result of two problems that relate directly to
intellectual property: the inability of people in lowincome
countries to pay for medicines and the resulting lack of incentives
for pharmaceutical firms to develop medicines for diseases that
disproportionately afflict persons in the lowincome countries.164
The current regime of global intellectual property rights also
seems to violate the Rawlsian difference principle. The difference
principle essentially provides that inequality must benefit
everyone. As long as the primary social goods of the worst off
group are increasing, inequality is fair and can continue to
increase. As soon as the primary social goods of the worst off
group stop increasing, then the society in question has reached the
maximum inequality permitted. We can conceptualize lowincome
countries or people in those countries as the worstoff groups in
global society. TRIPS makes people in lowincome countries worse
off. The current global intellectual property system, with patent
protecting prices, makes the worst off groups, the poorest of the
poor in low income countries, even worse off while benefiting better
off groups such as pharmaceutical firms in highincome countries.
Much of the empirics that would support the analysis under the
fair equality of opportunity principle would be relevant in the
application of the difference principle as well. The main difference
in the analysis, however, would be that Rawls’s analysis of the
difference principle facilitates some mathematization in the form
of comparisons of welfare based on the allocation of primary social
goods.
The solutions to unfairness in the TRIPS regime would not
differ from those suggested in the next section below. Notably, the
Rawlsian fairness criteria do not specify a particular solution, but
we can use them to understand the fairness of a solution. This is
not a controversial point. In this sense, ethical standards do not
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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differ from economic standards. They explain why, but not how.
The “how” is up to policy makers and lawyers.
As I have stressed in this article, I have not provided a
sufficiently detailed set of testable criteria for assessing TRIPS
using Rawlsian criteria, though I have tried to provide a sketch of
the issues that need further study. The purpose of this article is
facilitate the exploration of methods for assessing fairness, not in
providing definitive answers in the application to a particular
area.
2. The Scanlonian Approach
The Scanlonian contractualist analysis proceeds in sketch
form as follows. First, to use a phrase offered by Lief Wenar, what
do we owe to “distant” others?165 The answer in Scanlon’s account
would be principles no one could reasonably reject.
Using
Scanlon’s terms, we would examine objections to granting
intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals versus objections to
not granting them.166 The question may not be so binary, and it
may be a question of the strength of those rights. Putting this into
terms more easily understandable to lawyers, we would examine
objections to patent rights versus objections to exceptions or
derogations from patent rights. This gets us into examining
burdens and benefits. As tentatively sketched out above, the
burdens of poor health in lowincome countries are substantial.
On the other hand, losses to pharmaceutical companies do not
necessarily follow. 167 The benefits are improved health in the
populations of the lowincome countries are substantial. It would
seem that strong intellectual property rights are reasonably
rejectable while weak (or in some cases nonexistent) rights are
not. Can we develop these arguments through the articulation of a
principle?
Scanlon’s Principle of Rescue may be relevant. He articulates
his Rescue Principle for these cases: “if you are presented with a
situation in which you can prevent something very bad from
happening, or alleviate someone’s dire plight, by making only a
slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to
do so.”168 The Principle of Helpfulness, on the other hand, applies
when someone else would benefit from your help, and your help
165. Wenar, supra note 94.
166. The intellectual property right we will usually be concerned with for
pharmaceuticals are almost always patents, so some places in the text will refer only to
patent rights.
167. Chaudhuri, et al., supra note 127.
168. SCANLON, supra note 7, at 224.
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would mean a slight to moderate sacrifice on your part. It would
seem that the Principle of Rescue is more relevant, given the dire
need for affordable medicines in the lowincome countries.
I have sketched out above the burdens that TRIPS places on
consumers of drugs in lowincome countries. Recent economic
research on antibiotics in the Indian pharmaceutical market
indicates that these losses may be substantial, but that profit
gains to pharmaceutical firms are orders of magnitude lower.169
Thus, it would seem that compulsory licensing or some other form
of derogation from patent rights in pharmaceuticals could in
certain cases result in substantial benefits to persons in low
income countries with only slight or moderate sacrifice to patent
holders. The Principle of Rescue would seem squarely to apply in
such circumstances.
Could we derive a Principle of Equality in Normal Species
Functioning from contractualism? Recall that for contractualism a
“priority of the worst off” is a “feature of certain particular moral
contexts rather than a general structural feature of contractualist
moral argument.”170 Contractualism, lacking a political idea of
equality, makes no claims about equality or initial endowments.
Therefore, we might have difficulties with strict notions of equality
because they might be reasonably rejectable by some. On the
other hand, some limited notions of equality will survive the
Scanlonian complaint model. A limited form of equality exists in
the concept of health care as a means to obtain normal species
functioning at the level outlined here. The argument is that
health care (which includes availability of essential medicines)
“has as its goal normal functioning and so concentrates on a
specific class of obvious disadvantages and tries to eliminate
them.”171 The focus is not on eliminating all natural and social
differences, but on eliminating natural and social disadvantages
brought about by disease.
What if derogating from intellectual property rights in
pharmaceuticals actually would do substantial harm to the
incentive to innovate, to the point where worst off groups, and
other groups, are made worse off? Some avenues nevertheless
exist that would allow countries to meet the requirements of fair
access to essential medicines while still preserving the rights of
patent holders. The most obvious solution is donor assistance to
lowincome countries for the purchase of pharmaceuticals. Low
income countries tend not to have the manufacturing base to take
169.
170.
171.

Chaudhuri, et al., supra note 127.
Scanlon, supra note 7, at 228.
Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, supra note 152, at 166.
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advantage of compulsory licensing. The donor assistance approach
would also avoid difficulties associated with parallel importation of
generic drugs. Donors would pay patentprotecting prices. Such
an approach shifts the question away from discussions of rights to
health care to requirements on those able to provide assistance to
provide it. In the current international legal system, no such
obligations exist. Assistance is aid, and aid is charity. Scanlon
provides a procedure for deriving principles that no one can
reasonably reject and that helps us identify obligations and
requirements. Some countries have taken steps toward creating
such obligations, though these obligations remain essentially self
imposed. The United Kingdom, for example, has undertaken a
purchase commitment of 200 to 300 million doses each of
HIV/AIDS and malaria vaccines if such vaccines are developed. 172
One purpose for a purchase commitment is to provide
pharmaceutical firms with an incentive to innovate in the area of
neglected diseases, which are found in lowincome countries, where
affordability at patent protecting prices is a major obstacle.173
Another possible form of obligation are trust funds, if countries
could be obligated to submit funds to them.174
V. CONCLUSION
Developing and applying principles of fairness to global
economic institutions is hard work. It would be easier simply to
accept the dictates of power relations within the global economic
system as a given and go from there. The limited goal of this
article is to produce more reflection on alternatives to economic
efficiency and other quasiutilitarian conceptions of normativity in
the international economic order, with special reference to recent
work in contractualist moral philosophy. I have tried to develop a
few modest insights from moral philosophy into heuristics for
evaluating trade agreements. I have tried to offer an account that
differs from the Sen/Nussbaum capabilities approach. The broader
notion here is that my approach is an alternative to the
Sen/Nussbaum approach.
We are not far along on this process, and have much to do.
Until we derive and use principles rather than almost totally rely
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on states of affairs, we will continue to neglect the question of
justice in the world trade system.

